The second enclosure movement critique is familiar theoretical territory for scholars concerned with the creeping maximalist impulse of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs). Just as the first enclosure movement relating to real property created controversies concerning social contract and the advertised efficiencies of private real property, so too these concerns are echoed within the context of IPRs. This paper employs the emergent discourse of cultural environmentalism so as to diagnose and resolve IPR issues evident within the information environment. Cultural environmentalism borrows, begs, and steals analytical frameworks from environmentalism, such as those relating to the commons, public choice theory, welfare economics, and ecology. After proffering a brief overview of the second enclosure movement critique and cultural environmentalism, this paper settles on the analytical framework of the commons. Specifically, it is the commons-related tragedies such as the tragedy of the commons, the tragedy of the anticommons, and the tragedy of (ignoring) the information semicommons, that provide insight into critical efficiency concerns that lie dormant within the information environment. Ultimately, the paper argues that to ignore the benefits accruing from the dynamic interaction between private and commons
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the information environment, there is no past or pending singular grand disaster. The issues are many and cumulative. For some, concern about the information environment stems from United States Patent number 6,004,596 for a "Sealed Crustless Sandwich," which is effectively a patent for a peanut butter and jelly sandwich; for others, the concern stems from patents relating to Australian smokebush or Indian Turmeric or human genomes or perhaps algorithms. 2 Yet for others still, it is the general erosion of copyright exceptions or trademark expansion. Many are affected. Concerns raised by librarians, biotechnologists, software engineers, and parodists exemplify the broad range of issues at stake within the information environment Cultural environmentalism is an emergent discourse that seeks to borrow, beg, and steal analytical frameworks from contemporary enviromnentaism--such as those relating to the commons, public choice theory, welfare economics, and ecology-so as to diagnose and resolve issues within the information environment. 4 After a brief overview of the second enclosure movement critique and the emergent discourse of cultural environmentalism, this paper focuses on the analytical framework of the commons and related tragedy discourse; namely, it focuses on the tragedy of the commons, the tragedy of the anticommons, and the tragedy of (ignoring) the information semicommons. In so doing, the paper advocates the importance of recognizing the dynamic efficiencies of private and commons uses of information as per semicommons theory so as to move beyond the false dichotomy of the public/private information ownership debate. In the context of contemporary information ownership and regulation, the paper submits that private and commons uses must be thought of, at least in some instances, as symbiotic rather than mutually exclusive.
II. PART ONE: THE SECOND ENCLOSURE MOVEMENT
In the fifteenth century, the structure of land ownership in England began a rapid transformation. 5 Drawing upon a variety of methods, the aristocracy appropriated for private ownership land that had been 6 traditionally held in common. This was referred to as the "enclosure movement," whereby the right to exclude was utilized to convert the default form of land tenure from commons property to private property. 7 Enclosure has continued up until this day, albeit contemporary limitedcommons and semicommons analysis suggests a more complex picture 8 Boyle eloquently describes the first enclosure movement in "The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain" by depicting the controversial nature of real property rights. 7. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (characterizing "the right to exclude others" as "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commons characterized as property").
See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., PERSPECTIVES ON
PROPERTY LAW, at xviii (2d ed. 1995) (citing a shared dormitory room as common property);
[T]he law locks up the man or woman Who steals the goose from off the common But leaves the greater villain loose Who steals the common from off the goose. 10 Boyle's depiction of real property rights within the context of the first enclosure movement examines social contract questions regarding the legitimacy of state power and the creation of incentives that are seemingly inherent within those rights." "Seemingly," as empirical evidence does not always support a direct correlation between property rights and increasing production.1 2 The classic "tragedy of the commons" (discussed below) does not always eventuate in practice.
Property rights concerning both real property and intellectual property remain at center stage in contemporary theoretical discussion relating to economic efficiency and justice. Property definitions and descriptions abound from Hobbes to Locke to Blackstone to Hume to Proudhon.' 3 Although the definition of property differs depending on the context, at its simplest, Benkler describes property as a "cluster of background rules" that determine what resources each of us has when 687-88 (1986) .
13. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 18 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1651) (explaining that property rights are the subject of sovereign discretion, but that the sovereign is bound to offer the citizens certain protections relating to property ownership such as providing a judicial system of resolution in matters concerning property conflict); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § § 47-51 (C. B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publishing Co. Inc. 1980) (1690) (casting property within the social contract context whereby freedom is traded in for certain securities stemming from impartial sovereign protection of property); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 3 (Chicago University Press 1979) (1765) (defining property as the "sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe"); DAVID HUME, MORAL PHILOSOPHY 99-101 (Geoffrey Sayre-McCord ed. 2006) (advocating a pragmatic view of property whereby property ownership is adopted as a means of dividing limited resources but rejecting the social contract perspective of property); PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON or "lacking" a resource entails in our relations with these others.' 4 From the early days of intellectual property rights (IPRs), critics have voiced concerns about the broad-ranging nature of the -said rights. 5 In the United States, the founding generation of intellectuals had been nurtured on the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment and the history of the struggle against royal monopolies.' 6 They were not against IPRs per se, but they repeatedly referred to the necessity to restrict both its term and its scope so as to avoid low quality, high prices, and artificial scarcity.' 7 Specifically, they questioned whether individuals should have a right to carve out their own incremental innovations and protect them through IPRs in light of the fact that innovation occurs cumulatively.
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Furthermore, they were concerned, as are many contemporary scholars, that IPRs with lengthy term and scope might give too much control to a single individual or corporation over some vital aspect of culture and science, which may in turn affect the future of innovation. 9 The overarching theme, however, was the promotion of free trade and a corresponding opposition to monopolies. 20 IPRs have manifested in the second enclosure movement critique. 2 2 This critique encompasses the theme that information, knowledge, and culture have become increasingly privatized through the intellectual property system so as to secure the economic returns demanded by the manufacturers of the industrial information economy. 23 Within the academy, the second enclosure critique is exemplified by Lange's thought-provoking examination of the public domain, Samuelson's perceptive account of the application of copyright to computer programs and digital materials, and Litman's work on digital copyright and the public domain. 24 Boyle has enriched this theoretical landscape through his exploration of the basic romantic assumptions underlying intellectual property constructs, his description of the second enclosure movement, and, most importantly within the context of this paper, his visionary plea to adopt an environmentalist framework so as to preserve the public domain.
In diagnosing the harmful effects of the present enclosure movement, scholars such as Boyle, Lessig, and Benkler have all turned to empirical evidence, or the lack thereof, concerning the benefits and detriments of IPRs. 26 Traditionally, theorists have acknowledged both economic and moral justifications for IPRs. 27 That is, economically society is obliged to reward persons to the extent that they have produced something useful in accordance with the dictum "as one sows, so should one reap"; and morally, it is said that, at least within the context of liberal philosophy, that a person has a natural right to the product of her brain. 28 With respect to patents, the theory states, if an inventor cannot get a patent then she will have less incentive to invent because others will be able to benefit from her invention without the cost of creating it. 29 This is the classic provisioning problem that stems from (so-called) free-riding. 30 As the theory goes, if people are allowed to free-ride, there will be fewer inventors and, as a consequence, less progress in "science and useful arts. ' While the theory of incentivization and IPRs is compelling, most of the evidence that supports IPRs is indeed theoretical rather than empirical in nature. 32 It is true that, in theory at least, some types of innovation patents are very likely to induce more innovation, particularly where innovation is independent or noncumulative, which is to say that one invention is essentially separate from another. 3 3 Moreover, even where innovation is cumulative, if the use of the patent is obvious then the original patent holder will be compelled to license a patent to followon innovators. 34 Hence, it can be reasoned that there are situations where innovation will be assisted by the provision of patents as well as situations where it will be harmed. 6 Semicommons theory, espoused below, provides a theoretical foundation for this reasoning.
Within the incentivization context, Lerner's study concerning the economics of innovation is thought-provoking.
He considered amendments in intellectual property law in sixty countries over a time frame of 150 years, examining nearly 200 intellectual property policy changes. 37 His study found that investment in research and development decreases slightly when patent law is strengthened. 38 The inference is that when a country strengthens its patent protection, it marginally reduces the level of investment in innovation by local firms. 39 To be sure, empirical and theoretical scepticism concerning IPRs is not new. It has existed since the early days of the patent system. 40 Cultural environmentalism is an emergent field of inquiry that, inter alia, seeks to apply analytical frameworks of environmentalism to IPR issues. 4 It has stemmed from Boyle's submission that those who seek to protect the public domain and the intellectual commons are working toward a similar end as environmentalists. 45 Like many sociopolitical movements and discourses, cultural environmentalism is simultaneously reactive and proactive. It has "reacted" by exposing the harms caused by a relentlessly maximalist program of IPR expansion (as alluded to above). 46 It has "proacted" through the creation and maintenance of open source initiatives, creative commons projects, and distributed creativity (as alluded to below). 47 Attempting to define cultural environmentalism is fraught with difficulty.
From a literal perspective, decoupling "culture" from "environment" is a challenging task. 48 Despite culture being a fundamental theoretical sociological term, the 150 formal definitions suggest a lack of consensus among sociologists. 49 Benkler's musings on culture, however, are a useful starting point:
[Culture] is a frame of meaning from within which we must inevitably function and speak to each other, and whose terms, constraints, and affordances we always negotiate. There is no point outside of culture from which to do otherwise. 50 As we all "speak to each other" within the context of an "environment" of one sort or another, culture and the environment are inextricably linked. 5 ' The "environment" can be described as a system of interconnected and/or interdependent resources that comprise the "surrounding," "setting," or "context" that we inherit, live within, use, interact with, change, and pass on to future generations. 52 Moving beyond the literal, however, cultural environmentalism is much more than the compilation of two distinct terms. Just as the natural physical environment is inherited and passed on to future generations, so too the cultural environment is inherited and passed on. 53 The natural environment and the cultural environment both evolve. 54 If the metaphor is to be extended, there are numerous methods of constructing and deconstructing the ecosystems of the cultural environment. 55 Frischmann, for example, suggests that the ecosystems of the cultural environment can be distinguished using the parameters of broad categories such as culture and science, via intellectual property such as copyrights and patents or via the denomination of industry such as computer, biotechnology, and medicine. 
THE TRAGEDY OF (IGNORING) THE INFORMATION SEMICOMMONS
Cultural environmentalism is perhaps best understood through description rather than definition. At its core, it is concerned with reconciling economics and information regulation in a manner that promotes efficiency and justice. 7 It engages with this reconciliatory process by concerning itself with the manner in which the public domain and the commons can preserve the health and diversity of the information ecology. As Boyle states:
Right now, it seems to me that, in a number of respects, we are at the stage that the American environmental movement was at in the 1950s or 1960s. At that time, there were people-supporters of the park system, hunters, birdwatchers and so on-who cared about what we would now identify as "environmental" issues. In the world of intellectual property we now have start-up software engineers, libraries, appropriationist artists, parodists, biographers, biotech researchers, and others.
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As implied, the idea that "an environment" exists has allowed for the establishment of a coalition around a reframed conception of common interest. 59 This reframed conception of the common interest allows the duck-hunter and the bird-watcher to recognize their commonality in the sense that they both rely on the functioning of the wetlands and the accompanying ecosystem services. 60 Boyle explains:
The invention of the concept of "the environment" pulls together a string of otherwise disconnected issues, offers analytical insight into the blindness implicit in prior ways of thinking, and leads to perception of common interest where none was seen before.
Like the environment, the public domain must be "invented" before it is saved. Like the environment, like "nature," the public domain turns out to be a concept that is considerably more slippery than many of us realize. And, like the environment, the public domain nevertheless turns out to be useful, perhaps even necessary. 61 Boyle's contention is that, whereas the environmental movement illuminated the effects that social decisions can have upon ecology, cultural environmentalists seek to illuminate the effects that intellectual property laws can have upon culture and the information environment. 62 57. BOYLE, SHAMANS, supra note 25, at x. 58. Boyle 
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Cunningham: The Tragedy of (Ignoring) the Information Semicommons
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010 It is in this context that Boyle advocates for a set of analytical tools that advance the importance of the public domain:
[A] successful political movement needs a set of (popularizable) analytical tools which reveal common interests around which political coalitions can be built. Just as "the environment" literally disappeared as a concept in the analytical structure of private property claims, simplistic "cause and effect" science, and markets characterized by negative externalities, so too the "public domain" is disappearing, both conceptually and literally, in an intellectual property system built around the interests of the current stakeholders and the notion of the original author. In one very real sense, the environmental movement invented the environment so that farmers, consumers, hunters and birdwatchers could all discover themselves as environmentalists. Perhaps we need to invent the public domain in order to call into being the coalition that might protect it.
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One of the first points of call concerning contemporary environmentalism is "Silent Spring" published by Rachel Carson in 1962. 64 The work of Carson, coupled with the unwitting assistance of Leopold and perhaps Pigou, led to some unique insights that consequently shifted normative thought concerning societal governance decisions. 65 What might be coined the Rachel Carson Paradigm declared that, although humans naturally try to maximize their own accumulation of benefits and ignore negative effects of their actions, a society that wishes to survive and prosper must identify and take comprehensive account of the real interacting consequences of individual decisions, negative as well as positive, whether the marketplace accounts for them 66 or not. Attempts to achieve such expanded accountings, as much as 63. Boyle, A Politics, supra note 25, at 113. 64. Of course, Silent Spring was a seminal work that made a significant contribution to a contemporary movement. See RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). However, to postulate that the environmental movement has an explicit start date is to of course oversimplify history and undermine the "standing on the shoulders of giants" affect so common in the realm of cultural creation and production. Evidence of environmentalism, and the consequential placement value on the oikos, is scattered throughout history. Many of the justifications for environmental law and regulation relate to the cultural environment, at least at the level of basic economic analysis of market failures. 68 Thus, in addition to being politically attractive, at the outset cultural environmentalism has some theoretical commonalities with environmentalism that are worth exploring.
69 As Boyle states:
In both environmental protection and intellectual property, the very structure of the decisionmaking process tends to produce a socially undesirable outcome. Decisions in a democracy are made badly when they are primarily made by and for the benefit of a few stakeholders, be they landowners or content providers.
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rischmann suggests that this reference to the decisionmaking process speaks to the core problems of complexity and path dependence in interlinked ecologies. Contemporary environmentalism gained much of its persuasive power by pointing out that, for structural reasons, we were likely to make bad environmental decisions: a legal system based on a particular notion of what "private property" entailed and an engineering or scientific system that treated the world as a simple, linearly related set of causes and effects. 7 2 In both of these conceptual systems, the environment actually disappeared due to the fact that it simply did not chronicle in the analysis. 73 It is therefore of no surprise that the environment was not conserved. 74 The same might be said in relation to the public domain. 75 67. Id. 68. Frischmann, Cultural Environment, supra note 30, at 1089. 69. Like environmentalism, cultural environmentalism is not a passing fad. It is true that cultural environmentalism as a phrase only recently celebrated its tenth birthday by way of a "Cultural Environmentalism @ 10" symposium hosted by Stanford Law's School Center for Internet and Society, but the intellectual foundation of cultural environmentalism draws upon a rich tapestry of historical thought. See Symposium, supra note 45. Of course intellectual property is not a new concept. The first copyright can be traced to the Duke of Milan in 1461, and the Statute of Anne was enacted in 1709. Hence, although the maximalist tendencies of IPRs did not begin in earnest until the second half of the twentieth century, it would not be overly ambitious to suggest that the heritage of cultural environmentalism is found in the passing of centuries rather than the passing of decades. The invention of the "environment," however, has been no slight task for contemporary environmentalism. 76 Despite the rich philosophical history of environmentalist thought, contemporary environmentalists have found it necessary to rely upon several distinct analytical frameworks to advance environmental claims. 7 In no specific order, the first exemplary analytical framework is that of the commons and how it is used, regulated, and controlled. 78 The second is public choice theory, which speaks of the power of incumbents to shape law in their favor. 79 The third is welfare economics, which reveals the ways in which markets can fail to take into account negative (and positive) externalities associated with economic actors. 80 The fourth exemplary analytical framework is that of ecology, the comprehensive study concerning the connection of the variable, fragile, and complex interrelationships between living systems. 8 ' This paper focuses specifically on the analytical framework of the commons within the context of the cultural environment so as to develop the theoretical foundation concerning the critical need to appreciate the dynamic interaction between common uses and private uses within the information environment.
IV. PART THREE: THE COMMONS AND RELATED TRAGEDIES
The nature of the commons has been a source of contention within both environmentalism and cultural environmentalism. On the one hand, environmentalism has struggled with the tragedy of the commons with respect to nature: oceans, rivers, forests, and air.
8 2 On the other hand, cultural environmentalism has struggled with the tragedy of the anticommons, particularly in relation to innovations such as computer 76. Boyle, A Politics, supra note 25, at 110.
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Id. at 108-09 (referring to two analytical frameworks--ecology and welfare economics). While this is a useful starting point, this paper expands the set of environmental frameworks to include "the commons" and "public choice theory." Forthcoming work will expand on "public choice theory" and "welfare economics" within the IPR context. To appreciate and juxtapose the commons-related tragedies, the commons itself must be understood.
The Australian Oxford Pocket Dictionary defines the commons as "for joint use, shared; land belonging to the community." 4 The shared attributes of a common resource mean that the resource is free (libre) to the community in the sense that the resource is subject to usage without the permission of anyone else, or, if permission is granted, that it is done so neutrally.
8 5 A key attribute of the commons is that no single person or organization has exclusive control over the use or disposition of a 86 particular resource.
Rather, resources governed by commons may be used or disposed of by anyone (within a relevant community) in accordance with rules that may range from "anything goes" to quite crisply articulated formal rules that are effectively enforced. The most evident (regulated) commons in contemporary landscapes are the footpaths, roads, and highways that facilitate our ability to move from one place to the other. 8 8 More subtle but just as important, without which contemporary society could not function, is virtually all pretwentieth century knowledge and culture, a majority of scientific knowledge from the first half of the twentieth century, and the lion's share of contemporary science and academic learning. 8 9 From the commons perspective, Einstein's theory of relativity sits with the local beach or park or the nearest footpath since the (relevant) community can access these resources without the permission of anyone else. 90 As Reichman puts it, common resources are protected by a liability rule rather than a property rule. 9 It is doubtful that the commons can be described as obscure, as Lessig claims in "The Future of Ideas," but neither is the term exceptionally fashionable, as claimed by Gorman, who argues that the rhetoric of information commons diverts attention from the enduring value of libraries. 93 Both Lessig and Benkler employ the commons notion for normative and practical purposes, to promote freedom and individual liberty in seeking to halt the march of IPR maximalism, and to harvest the creative and economic bounty of social production.
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Questioning the presumptive link between commons and scarcity is an important dimension of this discourse, particularly as such discourse relates to the information ecology.
A. Information Ecology
Just as one speaks of ecology as it relates to natural physical systems, the notion of information ecology is also palatable. 9 An important dimension of information ecology is an appreciation of the role of rivalry and exclusion, particularly within commons discourse. 96 This is because rivalry and exclusion represent the axes of parameters and opportunities within the information commons. In this sense, both rivalry and exclusion are matters of degree, and together they provide insights into the ecology of information. 97 E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005). For an interesting discussion of the "liability rule" and its application to the contemporary commons, see Boyle For useful tables concerning rivalrousness of
Rivalry and Exclusion
In theory, any resource may be held in common, but pragmatically the question a society is confronted with is which resources should be, and for those resources, how.
98 If a resource is nonrivalrous, then the challenge relates to provision rather than depletion in the sense that the difficulty lies in providing enough incentive to produce the resource (i.e. provisioning problem) rather than ensuring that the resource is not overburdened by demand (i.e. depletion problem). 99 A rivalrous resource presents more challenges than nonrivalrous resources because when the resource is rivalrous the issues of provisions and depletion are simultaneously relevant.'°°B oth the depletion and provisioning problems give rise to an excludability requirement. Despite the dichotomy between pure public goods and pure private goods, the public or private nature of a resource is not necessarily a direct function of excludability (see Table 1 below). 01 Even within what might be loosely referred to as "the commons," the parameter of exclusion differs intensely. Open commons, for instance, can be distinguished from limited-access commons."
3 Examples of open commons include the oceans, the air and highway systems, whereas limited-access commons are exemplified by irrigation regions in Spain or Swiss villages, where access is limited only to members of the village or association that collectively "owns" some defined irrigation system or pastureland.1°4 As Carol Rose notes, these later examples are better labeled as limited common property regimes, rather than commons, because they behave as property vis-A-vis the entire world except members of the group who together hold them in common. 0 
Information Goods
The unique attributes of information mean that rivalry and exclusion especially come to the fore in relation to information goods. As Stiglitz and Grossman remind us, the economic analysis of information is riddled with internal paradox: Information is both a component of the perfect market and a good that must be produced within that market. 1 0 7 In the context of the former, information access and provision has long been a critical component of the perfect market.
1 0 8 As to the latter, information is to be commodified so as to overcome the provisioning problem discussed above. Herein lies the contradiction.
Each property right that is granted to ensure the production of information is a transaction cost when seen from the perspective of market efficiency.' 0 9 In this sense, " [t] here is a fundamental conflict between the efficiency with which markets spread information and the incentives to acquire information."" This fundamental conflict has often been subject to an illusory reconciliation process whereby problems are classified as either incentive-or efficiency-based problems."' A corollary of this illusory reconciliation is that many of the provisioning problems have become overstated, while the efficiency costs and other losses generated by the granted rights have generally been understated.12
The efficiency costs are encompassed within the second enclosure critique (discussed above) as a consequence of the artificial exclusion established by the legal protection of LPRs. The risk associated here is that the artificial exclusion established by the legal protection of IPRs is too strong, amounting to a "tragedy of the anticommons.' ' 1 3 With regard to the depletion problem, the unique nature of information means that there is no need to allocate its use since there is no danger of a "tragedy of the commons" as the information commons simply cannot be overgrazed.
IPRs are not only unnecessary to preserve the information commons, but may in fact amount to an artificial barrier to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REv. 561, 570-72 (1971) (arguing that patent law may be either a necessary incentive for the production of inventions or an unnecessarily legal monopoly in information that overcompensates an inventor who has already had the opportunity to trade on the information implied by her discovery). 
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
B. The Tragedy of the Commons
The original tragedy of the commons espoused by Hardin arises when too many people have a privilege to use a resource and no one user has a legal right to exclude any other user with the end result being over consumption and the depletion of the resource. 15 Hardin used the notion of a "pasture open to all" so as to make the point that each herdsman has an incentive to add more cattle than the pasture as a whole can bear since the costs of the cattle are socialized and the benefits of the cattle are privatized in favor of the herdsman. 16 Hence, under this tragedy each herder is motivated to add more and more animals because she receives the direct benefit of her own animals and bears only a share of the costs resulting from overgrazing. As Hardin describes the consequences:
Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit-in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.'
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Of course Hardin was not the first to become aware of the tragedy of the commons. Aristotle long ago observed that: property that is common to many has the least care conferred upon it. 11 8 The state of nature as described by Hobbes is yet another variation of this theme: People seek their own good and end up killing one another.' 1 9 In the nineteenth century, Lloyd outlined a theory of the commons that foresaw careless use for property owned in common; scholarship concerning resource economics also postulates that where a number of users have access to a common-pool resource, the cumulated resource units withdrawn from the resource will be more than the optimal economic level of withdrawal. 121 One of the great ironies of the tragedy of the commons discourse is that Hardin's thesis originally aimed to explain why private incentives would lead firms to pollute their environment even against their own long-term interest, and thereby to justify pollution controls. 22 The tragedy of the commons thesis has since taken on a life of its own coming to stand for the proposition that all commons are tragic and that property rights are a necessary precondition to efficient, or even sustainable, resource management.1 23 It is true that there is a diverse range of instances where the tragedy of the commons has eventuated. Examples include various famines, firewood provision crises, and climate change. 124 Nevertheless, it is equally true that not all commons situations have fallen into the trap of the commons dilemma.
1 2 5 Ostrom hypothesizes that the difference between those who fall victim to the commons dilemma trap and those who do not may relate to factors internal to a given group. 1 2 6 The participants may not have the ability to communicate with each other (as per the prisoner's dilemma), no means to foster trust, and no sense that they are to share a common future. 127 Moreover, even where a commons dilemma has become entrenched, the predicament may be rectified through strategic external assistance measures such as the provision of a government subsidy.1 28 Although the commons dilemma is not fait accompli, the notion that "the whole world is best managed when divided among private owners" has principally dominated public debate over the last three decades and, as a corollary, the prevailing tendencies have been to divide as many resources as possible among private owners so as to better manage the world. 129 Indeed, the coupling of the tragedy of the commons arguments with the Demsetzian notion that such "tragic" situations gives rise to solutions grounded in exclusionary property right regimes has provided a powerful springboard to support the neoliberal privatization propensity.
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The Demsetzian conception is symbolized by the work of Smith who pronounced the following "privatize or perish" perspective with respect to environmental conservation in 1981:
Both the economic analysis of common property resources and Hardin's treatment of the tragedy of the commons [means that] the only way to avoid the tragedy of the commons in natural resources and wildlife is to end the common-property system by creating a system of private property rights. 131 126. OSTROM, supra note 8, at 21. 127. Id. For an excellent overview of scholarship that discusses circumstances under which common property regimes are more efficient than individual property regimes, see Hess & Ostrom, supra note 97, at 118-21, suggesting that scholars sometimes conflate resource classification with property right issues.
128. OSTROM, supra note 8, at 21. This description of strategic behavior exemplifies the public choice theory scenario, which will be discussed in future research. This privatisation paradigm has dominated even though "our legal doctrine has strongly suggested that some kinds of property should not be held exclusively in private hands, but should be open to the public.' 3 2 Rose has pointed to this tension by implicating that the traditional rules concerning public acquisition of streets and roads does not sit comfortably with the private property assumptions of classical economic theory:
Indeed, public acquisition of roadways by long usage seems a particularly striking illustration of the imperviousness of practice to theory: the doctrines by which the public acquired roads over private property, without purchase even through eminent domain, flourished side by side with the popularization of classical economics and burgeoning of privately owned commerce and industry. 33 In the context of property-based ironies and the privatization predilection generally, Rose advances an argument-adopted by Lessig and Benkler-that the underutilization of resources might be as tragic as their exhaustion. 34 This, of course, is the tragedy of the anticommons. By contrast with the tragedy of the commons, the tragedy of the anticommons points to the quandary of where "too many owners hold rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to under use."' 3 5 The anticommons tragedy is, in many ways, the mirror image of the commons tragedy. 1
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C. The Tragedy of the Anticommons
Anticommons property exists where multiple owners have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use. 37 As others had already theorized that anticommons property might exist in theory, Heller's contributions were more nuanced.
38 Firstly, to demonstrate how a limited number of exclusory rights would suffice to generate anticommons property, and secondly, to provide actual physical-world examples of anticommons property. 3 9 An important differentiator between Hardin's tragedy of the commons and Heller's tragedy of the anticommons is the "right to exclude."' 40 As Aoki explains, in the commons tragedy, part of the problem is that no one has the right to exclude, thereby giving rise to over-utilization and depletion.' 4 ' By contrast, under the anticommons tragedy, too many parties independently possess the right to exclude, which gives rise to under-utilization amounting to the "tragedy of the anticommons.' 4 2 As the commons is defined as "for joint use, shared; land belonging to the community,' 143 most theorists assumed that the anticommons could only come into existence if every member had the right to exclude. 144 Since "member" in this context meant any person, the requirement was thought to mean that an anticommons would only occur if every single individual could prevent other uses.
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As a consequence, practically speaking, the anticommons under these preconditions would be virtually impossible. Given such difficult prerequisites, theorists were simply unable to conceptualize a physicalworld equivalent, and hence did not progress the argument. 146 Heller's insight concerning how a limited number of exclusory rights would suffice to generate anticommons property was used to demonstrate that a small number of individuals could effectively frustrate a more efficient use by others. 147 The classic example used by Heller to exemplify this phenomenon is that of the post-1989 Moscow storefronts that remained empty while at the same time flimsy metal kiosks promulgated.
148 Kiosk vendors were required to sell goods in the cold, rather than using the empty shops behind them, as a direct consequence of the complex bundle of property rights that had been Once anticommons property is created, markets or governments may have difficulty in assembling rights into usable bundles. After initial entitlements are set, institutions and interests coalesce around them, with the result that the path to private property may be blocked and scarce resources may be wasted.1 51 Heller argues that in the digital information era the anticommons poses a more serious threat than the post-1989 Moscow shopfronts because the digital brand of anticommons simultaneously averts better uses of the resource and conceals the recognition that better uses exist. 1 52 That is, while the empty Moscow shopfronts advertise the existence of the anticommons, in the digital information anticommons the new product that might have been generated through the novel use of gene fragments, for instance, is never realized. 5 3
One might theorize that if Adam Smith's perfect information were to exist, and if Coase's transaction costs were to disappear, and if all economic actors were perfectly rational and if economic actors did not engage in strategic behavior, then it may be possible to simply reassemble the various property entitlements into efficiently usable bundles. However, as one of Diderot's famous characters exclaimed when confronted by his masters relentless if questions: "If, if, if ... if the sea boiled, there would be a lot of cooked fish!' 5 4 In the physical world with less than perfect information, real transaction costs, irrational economic actors and active strategic behavior, the anticommons is difficult, if not completely impossible, to rebundle.' 5 5 It is at this juncture that the utility of semicommons theory becomes apparent, particularly as it underlines the nature of strategic behavior while simultaneously fostering an appreciation for the dynamic interaction between private and commons uses of information.
D. The Tragedy of (Ignoring) the Information Semicommons
As implied above, information is significantly different from most tangible commodities because of its nonrival and nonexclusive traits.' 56 Given this, the legal structures and policy discourse that surround information should also be different.'1 7 As information has become a critical raw material for production in the digital information age, questions concerning the ownership of information have dramatically increased in importance.
Two global viewpoints are generally identifiable concerning information ownership. The first concentrates on private ownership (and thus private control) of information in frameworks drawn primarily from property theory. 58 The second viewpoint gives attention to common ownership (and thus common control) of information. 59 For the most part, the two viewpoints are presented as a contra-distinction, where private use exists at the expense of common use and vice-versa.' Private use proponents advocate more private control, longer ownership terms, and more rights in relation to information, whereas commons proponents argue the opposite.
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The IPR debates primarily stem from the understanding that common and private uses of information are intrinsically at odds.
1 63 For instance, granting longer copyright protection for information is seen as having the effect of removing that information from the information Accordingly, copyright protection and the information commons remain mostly mutually exclusive.
6 5 A critical thread within this debate, as evidenced by the second enclosure movement critique, is that private property displaced the commons so as to make more efficient use of the resource in question. 66 Indeed, this thread has become so entrenched within contemporary [PR discourse that some IPR minimalists have pleaded to recast IPR discussion away from the property metaphor.1 67 Interestingly, despite this plea, Heverly postulates that there is perhaps scope to further develop the property metaphor within the information environment. 68 He employs this argument, not to add weight to the maximalist IPR arguments, but rather to shift the focus away from the public/private dichotomy of information ownership and on to the dynamic interaction between private and common uses of information. 69
The Semicommons
Heverly's arguments are built upon the insights of Smith, Rose, and others that all types of property contain rudiments of private and common ownership, albeit often one or the other dominates.
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As Smith explains, a person possesses quasi-private rights to that moving spot on the highway that her vehicle occupies when driving, yet a highway is accepted as a "commons" because that is its more significant feature.' 7 1 Likewise, a parcel of land that is subject to an easement for emergency services is generally thought of as "private."'l 7 2 It is this 167. Hunter, supra note 5, at 458-503 (arguing that the "place" metaphor used in discussing and referring to the Internet has colored our perceptions and led us to accept property based conceptions of information, and raising important issues as to the way in which metaphors affect law).
168. 
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Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010 dynamic interaction between private and common uses of resources that lies at the heart of semicommons theory. Within a semicommons, property is owned and used in common for one chief purpose; however, in relation to some other key purpose, private interests obtain property rights to separate pieces of the commons. Smith exemplifies the semicommons thus:
The archetypal example of a semicommons is the open-field system of medieval and early modem northern Europe. In the open-field system, peasants had private property rights to the grain they grew on their individual strips of under 1 acre, which were scattered in two or three large fields around the central village. However, during certain seasons, peasants would be obligated to throw the land open to all the landowners for grazing their animals (especially sheep) in common, under a common herdsman. This enabled them to take advantage of economies of scale in grazing and private incentives in grain growing (with no important scale economies).' 73 Traditionally under the open-field system, a peasant grain grower engaged in strategic behavior by influencing, coercing or bribing the shepherd to graze the flock on other private users' plots during the day (so as to avoid the detrimental impact on the soil from grazing), and to pen up the flock on his property at night (so as to capture the benefit of fertilization from sheep droppings). 74 To avoid this strategic behavior, a private owner's lands were scattered throughout the designated area of the whole grazing land.' 75 The rationale of this approach was to increase the cost of engaging in strategic behavior in that it made it very difficult, if not impossible, for the grazing shepherd to work out whose land the flock was either grazing upon in the day or enclosed in for the evening. 176 As the scattering created property demarcation challenges for the shepherd, agreement between the shepherd and the private user concerning strategic grazing or enclosure of the flock involved considerable transactions costs. As a corollary, scattering had the effect of minimizing strategic behavior while at the same time capturing Although scattering may appear prima facie inefficient due to peasant farmers being required to farm in varied locations, this apparent inefficiency was in fact a source of efficiency when the costs of strategic behavior were taken into account.
179 As Smith explains, scattering of private plots, and thus private uses, was part of the overall design used to prevent strategic behavior, and in this sense it was an economically efficient, and indeed rational, method of property ownership.1 80 This is particularly the case in that semicommons property ownership maximized wealth to an extent not possible under either a purely common or a purely private ownership scheme.
The Information Semicommons
In adapting semicommons theory to the information environment, Heverly employs the "fair use" copyright doctrine so as to draw attention to the interaction of private and common uses of information.1
The example of a standard book review within the information environment demonstrates the benefits of an information semicommons property scheme. 182 Heverly submits that a book reviewer often relies upon fair use provisions within the IPR regime to quote a book author's words for the purposes of critiquing and reviewing the book.
183 This is a classic example of an information semicommons as clearly private and common uses are interacting. This interaction is dynamic in the sense that private use affects commons use and vice versa.' 4 The benefit lies in the exposure to the public that the author 178. Smith property, and exceptions such as fair use are viewed as tolerable infringements on the rights of private property owners). 182. In relation to the costs of prohibiting strategic behavior within the information semicommons, strategic behavior can be exemplified from the perspective of information users or producers. Unauthorized copying and distribution of information goods exemplifies the former.
The latter can be exemplified by anti-competitive behavior known as tying whereby information producers require information users to purchase additional information (or non-information goods) so as to be granted legal access to desired information. For further discussion, see Heverly receives of her book. 1 85 In this sense, the fair use provisions within IPR might be thought of as the equivalent of an easement in real property in that both private and common uses are better off for the existence of the other. Heverly states that if we imagine that, from its inception, Copernicus's "De Revolutionibus" was subject to pure private control to the point where all common uses were prohibited, then we begin to understand the importance of the dynamic interplay between private and common uses of information. 16 Examples of laws that combat strategic behavior in the information environment include the requirement that property rights in information not be automatically perpetual, and the use of definitions that set the boundaries of information protection such as where copyright law protects particular expressions of information fixed in a tangible medium without allowing ideas to be copyrighted. 8 7 Fair use provisions inherent within copyright law provide yet another example of averting strategic behavior since it protects common users' rights to use information to criticize information owners, even in the face of the information owners' explicit objection.
18 8 The fair use provisions are in fact so fundamental to the semicommons perspective of information that Heverly suggests that information is in fact a natural semicommons because too much change in the landscape of fair use, and the Supreme Court would reject the changes based on the needs of the First Amendment. 9 Once it is accepted that IPRs create a property regime in information, the application of the semicommons theory to the IPR regime is readily achieved. The application of semicommons theory to information does, however, entail a more detailed exposition of the dynamic nature of the private and common uses of information than was required for Smith (1985) . Note that Heverly discusses strategic behavior from both the information producer perspective and the information user perspective. For example, "[a]nother method used to dissuade strategic behaviour from a legal perspective is the use of enforcement actions by information owners. Where information owners bring lawsuits for the unauthorized use of information, common users may reduce their strategic behaviour." Heverly, supra note 47, at 1179. This paper focuses solely on strategic behavior by the information producer.
188. commons uses have largely been left out of the debates concerning information ownership and regulation.' 9 ' Although a full cost-benefit analysis of the information semicommons is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to recognize, as Heverly does, that in many instances information does fall within a semicommons framework.
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And that, in at least some instances, the information semicommons is wealth-maximizing in that the private uses benefit the commons uses and vice versa. If Heverly's insights are coupled with Lessig's "code as law" principle, it can be reasoned that when the regulation of information tends from law to technology, the possibilities of realizing efficiencies associated with a semicommons structure are removed from the costbenefit semicommons equation. 193 As such efficiencies are removed from the equation, they simply disappear. Traveling full circle back to Boyle's analysis, just as the environment disappeared, and just as the public domain disappeared, so too the efficiencies related to the dynamic interaction between private and commons uses has disappeared.
Of course, the idea of governance by architecture is not new. 194 Even under the traditional open-field system of medieval Europe the semicommons was governed not just by law, but also by architecture and technology. 95 Likewise, as Lessig has stressed, the information environment is often bound to a greater extent by technology than law. 196 Digital Rights Management (DRM) technology, such as DVD CSS encoding, exemplifies this trend as it provides potentially absolute bars against actions that private users consider strategic on the part of common users. 1 97 Technology manufacturers and information producers cooperate, drawing upon DRM technology, to assure technological protective measures are implemented so as to provide what is a strong, effective, and inexpensive means of combating strategic behavior.
While undoubtedly the avoidance of strategic behavior is an important aspect of semicommons theory, it is to be noted that the simple avoidance of strategic behavior does not per se equate to efficiency.'
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The cost-benefit equation of the semicommons involves weighing up the benefits that flow from the dynamic relationship between private and commons uses and the costs of avoiding the strategic behavior.' 99 If the focus remains on the avoidance of strategic behavior without an acknowledgment of the benefits that flow from the dynamic interaction between private and commons uses, then the semicommons efficiency equation is unjustly skewed. It is this dynamic that establishes a tragedy of great proportion: the tragedy of (ignoring) the information semicommons.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has made an important contribution to furthering the employ of environmental analytical frameworks to IPR issues through cultural environmental discourse. The broad nature of challenges arising within the contemporary information environment, and the interaction between these challenges and the IPR regime, makes it imperative to employ and develop the analytical frameworks of cultural environmentalism. 2 00 The end goal is to diagnose and resolve contemporary information environment challenges.
After outlining the second enclosure movement critique 2 0' and the emergent cultural environmental discourse, 2 this paper settled on the analytical framework of the commons and related tragedy discourse being the tragedy of the commons, the tragedy of the anticommons and the tragedy of (ignoring) the information semicommons. 203 Through the engagement of this tragedy discourse it was argued that it is critical that IPR dialogue move beyond the commons/private dichotomy of property ownership, toward a more mature dialogue that recognizes the efficiencies that arise from the dynamic interaction between different types of property ownership. 2 4 Indeed commons and private usages of information need not be mutually exclusive, and can in fact be symbiotic leading to mutual benefits. 20 5 The paper submits, in closing, that Lessig's ideas relating to the perpetual struggle between freedom and control within the information environment 2 0 6 might be best anointed through semicommons theory. It is true that it is a vexed question as to how to determine whether particular information resources should be private or public; free or controlled; or rather whether information should display a combination of ownership/regulation traits. Nevertheless, the struggle need not be without purpose or achievement.
The tragedy of (ignoring) the information semicommons is by no means inevitable and, indeed, if appropriate institutional arrangements are struck the results may be truly "comedic" in the classic sense of a happy outcome. 2°7
